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Testimony of Viet Dinh 
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center 
Hearing: Federal Regulatory Jurisdiction 
September 12, 2007 
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, 
 
Thank you for the invitation to appear before you today on the issue of regulatory preemption. 
The question of preemption in our constitutional structure is an important but often 
misunderstood concept with significant consequences to ordinary Americans. Given the growth 
of federal legislation and regulation into virtually all aspects of human endeavor beginning in the 
second half of the last century, it is understandable that some policymakers, scholars, and judges 
would look to curb the effect of such federal activity by revamping preemption doctrine to 
circumscribe the preemptive effect of federal law and regulations. I think this effort, although 
very well-intended, is a mistake. 
 
The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides that "the Laws of the 
United States * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land." The practical effect of this 
declaration is that federal law displaces conflicting state laws or local ordinances. Although this 
clause makes clear that federal enactments trump (or "preempt") conflicting state law, the 
Supremacy Clause itself does not authorize Congress, or federal agencies through regulations, to 
preempt state statutes. Instead, the Supremacy Clause simply provides a choice-of-law rule that 
favors federal law over state law in the event of a conflict. 
 
Thus, to the extent that there are constitutional policy questions raised by federal preemption of 
state law, the Framers have answered them in favor of the federal government through inclusion 
of the Supremacy Clause. Solicitude for the regulatory province and sovereign prerogatives of 
the states-a sentiment that I share-must find constitutional expression elsewhere, apart from a 
disdain for or presumption against preemption. 
 
The inquiry into the circumstances under which federal law will displace state law is no more 
and no less than an exploration into the division of state and federal legislative authority. The 
constitutional structure in this regard is straightforward: Article I, section 8 enumerates the 
powers of Congress; Article I, section 9 limits the powers of Congress; Article I, section 10 
limits the powers of the states; and the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states the legislative 
powers not delegated to Congress or prohibited to the states. Importantly, clause 2 of Article VI 
provides that congressional enactments consistent with the Constitution "shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land." Although the Supremacy Clause makes clear that congressional enactments 
have an extraordinary displacing effect on state law, the clause itself does not authorize Congress 
to preempt state laws. If the clause were an affirmative grant of authority, it would likely reside 
in the metropolis of congressional power, Article I, section 8, rather than in the suburbs of 
Article VI. 
 
The history of the Constitutional Convention supports this reading. The Virginia Plan included 
among its proposed congressional powers the broad authority "to negative all laws passed by the 
several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of the Union." 
The alternative New Jersey (or Small State) Plan, on the other hand, did not include such 
authority among the powers of Congress, but rather separately proposed language similar to the 
current Supremacy Clause. When the competing proposals were debated by the Convention, 
James Madison, as he had done throughout the debates, warned against the "propensity of the 
States to pursue their particular interests in opposition to the general interest" and advocated "the 
negative on the laws of the States as essential to the efficacy & security of the Genl. Govt." 
Governor Robert Morris of Pennsylvania opposed the congressional power to negative state laws 
with the telling explanation that "[a] law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the 
Judiciary department and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a National Law." The 
Virginia Plan's proposal for a legislative power to negative state laws was defeated by a vote of 3 
to 7. The Convention then adopted a revised version of the New Jersey proposal which was 
almost identical to the current Supremacy Clause. Consistent with the New Jersey Plan's 
structure and Morris' explanation, the adopted text does not mention any affirmative authority of 
Congress, but simply sets forth the hierarchy between federal and state laws. 
 
The power to preempt state law, therefore, must be found elsewhere in the Constitution, most 
logically in the affirmative grants of power to Congress under Article I, section 8. For example, 
should Congress legislate pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause and wish to include 
a provision expressly preempting certain state laws, the authority for the preemption provision 
must come from the Commerce Clause alone or perhaps from the Commerce Clause with some 
help from the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Supremacy Clause then makes clear that the 
preemption provision trumps state laws that conflict with it. 
 
Accordingly, to the extent that there are questions of constitutional policy in preemption - "the 
Danger . . . that the national, would swallow up the State Legislatures," and the like - the framers 
answered them with the specific enumerations and limitations of federal legislative power in 
Article I and inclusion of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI. To find in this structure some 
additional substantive reason to disfavor federal preemption of state law, it seems to me, risks 
rewriting the balance envisioned by the Framers - a balance that, it bears reminding, James 
Madison and others thought should have been weighted even more in favor of Congress. 
 In sum, the Constitution's text, structure, and history provide no support for a presumption 
against preemption. Indeed, the constitutional provision most frequently invoked in preemption 
analysis, the Supremacy Clause, evinces, if anything, a presumption favoring preemption. 
Finding a presumption against preemption in the Supremacy Clause is rather like locating in the 
Eleventh Amendment a presumption favoring federal jurisdiction over suits against States. 
 
The lack of support for a presumption against preemption is equally apparent in the context of 
regulatory preemption. It is of no moment that the federal enactment displacing state law is one 
promulgated by a federal agency through regulations rather than a statutory provision enacted by 
Congress. Consistent with traditional administrative law principles, validly promulgated 
regulations authorized by the agency's organic statute have the force of law and thus also trump 
state law by operation of the Supremacy Clause, because "[t]he phrase 'Laws of the United 
States' encompasses both federal statutes themselves and federal regulations that are properly 
adopted in accordance with statutory authorization. Indeed, federal agencies are given a great 
degree of latitude to pre-empt state laws to the extent it is believed that such action is necessary 
to achieve its purposes, even absent express authorization from Congress: "A pre-emptive 
regulation's force does not depend on express congressional authorization to displace state law ... 
 
The absence of any firm constitutional basis for the presumption against preemption deprives 
any attempts to limit regulatory preemption of any claim of superior fealty to the Framers. 
Congress, nonetheless, could prefer as a policy matter to preserve state law. The simplest way for 
Congress to do so is to recognize the limits on its enumerated powers and decline to legislate. 
When Congress does legislate, it can preserve state law by including an express savings 
provision. Finally, Congress can enact background rules to govern how it will preempt state law 
in the future. This third category would require future Congresses to preempt explicitly or not at 
all. 
 
Although Congress has the power to enact such legislation, I question the wisdom of such a 
background rule based on its effects on the concurrent operation of state and federal regulatory 
authority. I do not address here the possible challenges to such legislation based on intrusion into 
the judicial function in interpreting statutes or on infringement of the prerogative of future 
Congresses. I have no quarrel with an enactment aimed at forcing the Executive Branch to 
consider the implications of displacing state law-anything that forces the federal government to 
stop and think whether it is the proper forum to address a problem ultimately should produce 
better policy. However, it bears noting that regulatory agencies are already required to do so, 
under Executive Order 12612, first issued by President Reagan in 1987 and reaffirmed by every 
successive chief executive. 
 
Any Congressional action that would limit preemption to only those cases where Congress 
explicitly states that preemption is intended or where there is a direct conflict between state and 
federal law would work a sweeping legislative repeal of the doctrine of implied preemption. It 
would compel Congress to preempt in express terms not only state laws, but also local 
ordinances. One will search the Constitution in vain for any solicitude for the legislative 
province of a city council. 
 
Such legislation would upend constitutional supremacy and create a presumption in favor of 
overlapping regulation by multiple jurisdictions. It would favor regulation by a limitless number 
of governments at three or four different levels - one Congress, 50 state legislatures, numerous 
county boards, and countless city councils. Nothing in our constitutional structure provides any 
support for such a presumption. Indeed, many of the enumerated powers expressly granted to 
Congress - from the power "to borrow money on the credit of the United States," to the power 
"to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies 
throughout the United States," to the power "to declare war" - were meant to be exclusive. The 
Framers identified the areas in which overlapping state regulations created problems or potential 
for havoc. They then gave Congress limited, enumerated powers to legislate in those areas and 
avoided the problem of conflicting regulation by thirteen separate sovereigns. From this 
perspective, it is actually more difficult to justify non-preemptive federal legislation than federal 
legislation that occupies the regulatory field. If there is no need to provide a uniform federal rule, 
it should be harder - not easier - to justify the need for any federal rule at all. 
 
The requirement that Congress must preempt explicitly or not at all creates an additional 
practical problem: Congress cannot possibly foresee all of the potential conflicts that may 
materialize when it first enacts a statute. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 US. 504 
(1992), the Court concluded that Congress' explicit preemption of certain laws evidenced an 
intent not to preempt other laws, a holding much less dramatic than the Act's requirement that 
Congress always be explicit about preemption. Nonetheless, it was too much for Justice Scalia, 
who predicted that such a rule of construction would work havoc: "The statute that says anything 
about pre-emption must say everything; and it must do so with great exactitude, as any ambiguity 
concerning its scope will be read in favor of preserving state power. If this is to be the law, 
surely only the most sporting of Congresses will dare say anything about preemption." 
Cipollone, 505 US. at 548 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 
To establish a presumption against preemption in the regulatory field would be to remove from 
Congress the option of not saying anything about the topic. It forces every Congress to be 
sporting, to anticipate and address with clarity every potential conflict that could arise. That task 
will prove impossible. Even if Congress could somehow divine the myriad ways that extant state 
and local regulations may frustrate a federal regulatory regime, it simply cannot predict 
developments in state common law or anticipate the future legislative agendas of States and 
localities. Whether Congress would react by preempting more or less than necessary is anyone's 
guess. However, I rather doubt that such an enactment will lead to more intelligent legislation or 
better consideration of the proper balance between state sovereignty and federal interests. 
 
Federal agencies exist to coordinate areas of national public concern. To allow state law to 
preempt or even coexist with certain areas of federal regulation undermines the very existence of 
these agencies and Congress's objectives in delegating specific authority to the agencies. These 
agencies have expertise in regulatory areas and are attune to the national problems in those areas, 
allowing them to balance national needs and public concerns with the need for innovation and 
public protection in a realistic manner. 
 
Courts and juries applying state law in ex post situations are not in a vantage point to adequately 
take into account the nation's needs or the far-reaching effects of their decisions. When lawsuits 
under state law are brought - indeed, encouraged by other such successful lawsuits - in an area of 
regulation that has previously been regulated by an executive agency, the implication is that the 
plaintiff is in a better position to assess the safety determinations made by experts in federal 
agencies. Few would argue that this is the case. 
 
Federal agencies are uniquely positioned to promulgate rules with wide-sweeping national 
effects precisely because regulation in these areas on the state level may negatively impact that 
field. When a state regulates, it does so with its own citizens, circumstances, and particular needs 
in mind. Although Madisonian republicanism aims to utilize states as "experimental 
laboratories," in some areas of governmental concern namely, those areas in which federal 
agencies exist - regulation at the state level will be done without adequate information and 
feedback on the overall efficacy and effects of a governmental program. 
 
Such state regulation in these spheres may be inefficient in other ways. States may expend time 
and money formulating and enforcing rules and regulations which are duplicative. Those who are 
regulated will also feel the effects of duplicative, confusing or conflicting state regulations. For 
example, regulation at the state level for national (or international) companies will result in a 
single company being subject to many different or even conflicting laws. As a result, a company 
will expend time and money researching and ensuring compliance with the laws of various 
jurisdictions-time and money that could be spent on research and development. Inevitably, the 
added costs of compliance will be passed down to the consumer - the American public. Concerns 
about liability and confusion over jurisdictional differences may deter companies from engaging 
in the development of new innovations. This confusion will also result merely from allowing 
state regulations to coexist alongside federal regulations. 
 
Regulation at the federal level also helps prevent nationwide market failures. For example, the 
federal government is in a better position to constrain monopoly pricing and to remedy 
"externality problems" that result when costs do not fall on those making decisions. States will 
be placed in a position where they may be able to "free ride" off the investments of other states. 
Because costs will spill over to other jurisdictions, the actual effects of local regulations will not 
fully be accounted for when decisions are made. The same is true at the international level. 
Regulations created in the United States - particularly in areas such as U.S. capital markets - 
affect both the national and international growth of the country, and thus its position in the global 
arena. The national government, the repository of diplomatic and foreign affairs powers, is better 
situated to deal with such considerations. 
 
Independent federal agencies in particular are able to capably perform their jobs better than state 
regulators because they are also more insulated: agencies such as the SEC and Federal Reserve 
are subject to terms of office that do not fully correspond to presidential elections and are able to 
issue rules without review by the White House. Furthermore, all federal agencies promulgate 
rules according to the Administrative Procedure Act. This requires that, before an agency issues 
a rule, the proposed rule be subject to "notice and comment" procedures. This is an excellent 
opportunity for interested parties to object to the proposed rule's preemption of state law on the 
issue. If sufficient opposition is voiced, the rule will not be issued. This is a significant check on 
the power of the federal government to preempt state law. 
 
Executive Order 12162 also provides a valuable check on federal regulatory action. The Order 
ensures that executive departments taking federal action that would limit the policymaking 
discretion of the states only act when it is necessary. Such action also may occur only when 
constitutional authority for the action is clear and certain, and the national activity is necessitated 
by the presence of a problem of national scope. This Executive Order guarantees that federal 
agencies will only take action when the aforementioned advantages afforded by federal 
regulation outweigh the problems presented by state regulation. Further, for any regulations that 
would preempt state law or directly regulate the states in ways that interfere with traditional state 
functions, executive agencies would be required to submit the regulation to Congress for 
approval. Because there are certain areas in which federal government action is more desirable 
than decentralized state regulation, one might be concerned about federal government inaction. 
However, notice and comment periods (as well as direct petitioning of Congress) can be used by 
states to voice concerns regarding lack of effective federal enforcement. 
 
I respect the principles that preserve and protect the delicate structure of "Our Federalism" 
against the aggrandizing propensities of the national government. Well-meaning scholars and 
legislators have lamented the fact that expansive congressional power under Article I, section 8 
coupled with the displacing effect of preemption means that the Framers' fear that the Federal 
Government would swallow up the State Legislatures has been realized in the modern regulatory 
state. The solution, it is advocated, comes in the form of a judicial presumption against 
preemption or a pre-imposed requirement by Congress of a clear statement of preemption in 
order to counterbalance the awesome effect of the Supremacy Clause. It seems to me that these 
proposed solutions are supported by neither constitutional theory nor sound legislative policy. 
 
Redefining the proper balance of state and federal legislative powers is better accomplished 
directly, through an insistence on the limits of Congress' enumerated powers under Article I, 
rather than circuitously and ineffectually through tinkering with the Supremacy Clause. When 
Congress refrains from exercising its power under, say, the Commerce Clause and its attendant 
authority to preempt state law, it properly recognizes the competency, legitimacy, and authority 
of states to regulate matters within their legislative jurisdiction. At the same time, the federal 
government remains free to regulate, and displace state law if necessary, in order to protect 
national interests in areas within its legislative responsibility, as enumerated in the Constitution. 
